Introduction to Small Stakes No-Limit Hold ’em: Help Them Give You Their Money

Introduction to Small Stakes No-Limit Hold ’em: Help Them Give You Their Money

Hi Everyone:

Here's part of the Introduction to or upcoming book Small Stakes No-Limit Hold ’em: Help Them Give You Their Money. We expect to have the printed book up on Amazon in less than a month:

Introduction

Let’s start this book off with a few examples. These are just a few of the many types of hands which for the live small stakes games, usually $2-$5 or less, that we play differently from the way almost all other players in these games will play them, and is also different from much of the standard advice that is out there. So why do we do this?

The answer is simple. Against poor playing opponents, the best strategy for maximizing your win rate is to exploit these players as much as possible, sometimes with plays that look extreme. Especially to an “expert” player who often relies on Game Theory Optimal (GTO) to model his strategy.

Now, we understand that those who usually play GTO will, when appropriate, exploit their opponents. They do so when they see an opponent playing very badly which will make them make changes to their standard strategy. But they usually do this only in very obvious cases.

But that’s not the way we play these small stakes games. In these games, assuming the game is eight or nine-handed, it’s common to be against four ot more terrible players, and even most of the remaining players, who are usually semi-competent, will still make some significant errors, especially late in the hand when the big bets are in play.

If you were to go into a higher stakes (live) game, usually $5-$10 and up, where there are many strong players, and do many of the things that we’ll be recommending, your results will probably be disappointing. But if you stick to a game like $1-$3 no-limit hold ’em where the maximum buy-in is usually 100 to 200 big blinds, and follow the advice that is contained in this book, we suspect that you’ll be quite surprised and pleased with your results.

Our approach is not looking to make lots of great plays where you may steal a pot or knock a player out who, if he had stayed in, might have beaten you on a later street. We’re also not interested in constantly balancing our strategy and putting our opponent(s) at an “indifference point.” The experts can worry about that stuff, and if that’s your approach, play the higher stakes or perhaps limit hold ’em where recognizing small edges is highly important. But if you simply want to let your opponents give you their money, we’ll show you how to do it.

A Few Examples

(Again, these examples show you only a small number of the many ideas we will soon tell you about.) To see what we’re talking about, here are five examples. Notice that in every one of these hands, we’re playing differently, and sometimes very differently, from the way most poker instructors, coaches, book authors, poker video content producers, etc., will tell you how to play. It's true that, in general, their advice may be reasonably good, especially against tougher players than those we’ll be addressing. But it won’t be well targeted for these small stakes games. And if you’re playing live, these are the vast majority of games that are spread in our public cardrooms.

Example No. 1: Here’s a hand that David played in a Las Vegas $1-$3 game. It’s an extreme example, but we want to start with it to show how different many of the strategies in this book are and to give you an idea of how different, in some situations, our approach to maximizing your expectation is from the typical player, and this includes most of those who are currently having some success in live $1-$2, $1-$3, $2-$5, and similar no-limit hold ’em games.

In a $1-$3 no-limit game, David was dealt the

K K

two positions to the right of the button. The first four players limped in and David only called. The next two players folded, the small blind called, and the big blind checked.

The flop came the

J 9 7

The under-the-gun player bet, two players called, and then David threw his pair of kings in the muck.

Virtually no one else, at the time of this writing, would play a pair of kings in late position in a multiway pot this way. They would have made a substantial raise before the flop, and on the flop they would have certainly played their hand.

But let’s notice something obvious. If one of the last two positions or one of the blinds would have raised, when the action got back to David, he would have the option to make a big reraise, and if there were also a couple of callers, he would almost always be a large favorite to win a big pot assuming he got at least one caller.

As for his fold on the flop, given the way the hand was played, the reason for David’s fold is a little more complex, and that will be explained in detail later in this book. He would not have folded if the flop would have come something like the

J 7 2:

So, this example should give you an idea of what this book is about. To be specific, it’s playing your hands in the way that will exploit the weak players to the maximum. And as you can see from this example, some of the ways to do this aren't the ways that are generally advocated by the current crop of poker instructors and poker coaches as well as some of whom have been around. But there are ways, which will allow you to win the maximum at a reasonable risk that these small live stakes games have to offer.

Example No. 2: This hand was played by David. Under-the-Gun in a $1-$3 game at a full table, David held the

A K

Instead of raising first in as most poker instructors would recommend, he limped in for $3 and got three callers behind him plus the big blind. So, after the rake, there was $15 in the pot.

The flop came the

K 9 4

and with top pair, top kicker, David bet $15 and got one caller. The pot (after the rake) is now $42.

David saw that his lone opponent only had $80 left. And when a T came on the turn, David bet $80 and was called by his opponent who was now all-in. Unfortunately, a club came on the river and this player showed the

6 2

for a flush which won the pot.

Now some of you might say that if David had raised before the flop, as most players would, he would have won the pot. But notice that he got his opponent to call a large bet (for this game) getting 1.5-to-1 odds when he needed to make a 4-to-1 shot. So, theoretically, David won much more playing the hand this way than he would have won playing the hand in a conventional manner. And over time, these theoretical wins do turn into real money.

Example No. 3: Here’s a hand that Mason played. A timid early position player limped in, and Mason had concluded that this player absolutely never bluffed. Everyone folded to Mason who called with the 77 on the button. The small blind folded and the big blind checked.

Three random cards, including one overcard to the sevens, flopped. The big blind checked, the timid player bet a modest amount, and Mason folded.

Example No. 4: Here’s another hand that Mason played. In a $1-$3 game, an overly loose-aggressive player, two positions to the right of the button, raised to $10. The button called and Mason, who held the

A K

in the big blind called. Notice that the standard play would be to make a big reraise.

The flop came the

J 6 3

Mason checked, the loose-aggressive player bet $15, the button folded, and Mason called with his ace-king and three-flush. The turn was the 6 giving Mason a four-flush. Mason checked, the loose aggressive player bet $25, and Mason called.

The river was the A. Mason checked, the loose-aggressive player bet $50 and Mason called with his (now) aces-up and king kicker. The loose aggressive player then turned over the

A 2

Notice that he had bet a total of $100 on all four streets and never had the best hand.

Example No. 5: And for our final example, here’s a hand that David played. Before the flop in a $1-$2 game that had a maximum $300 buy-in, David called a limp with the

8 7

Five players, not including the small blind, saw the flop, and after the rake there was $10 in the pot. The flop was the

A 9 4

which gave David a flush draw. An early position player bet $8, and David called. Now there was $25 (after the rake) in the pot and both players had plenty of chips. The turn was a blank and David’s opponent bet $15 into the $25 pot bringing it to $38 (after the rake). This meant that David would be receiving immediate odds of $38-to-$15, or 2.53-to-1, to call. And since making a flush on the river is approximately 4-to-1, even if David can collect an additional bet when his flush comes in, this does not seem like enough to warrant a call. But David went ahead and called, bringing the pot to $52 (after the rake).

The flush card came on the river. The early position player checked, and David bet $70, $18 more than the size of the pot. And after thinking for a while, the early position player called and his top pair lost to the flush and David made $108 on his $15 call, which is approximately 7.2-to-1 on a 4-to-1 shot.

20 November 2023 at 04:32 AM
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306 Replies

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by BullyEyelash P

It would be very helpful IMO to know how this pot got to $80 in a (presumed) 1-3 game, though I do understand the concepts the problem is trying to illuminate.

Could get to a lot more than that. limp, limp, raise to 20, 4 callers. 98 to the flop after blinds and rake. Bet of 50 and one caller. Even without a raise, it is about 200. Do you play much live 1/3?


by deuceblocker P

Could get to a lot more than that. limp, limp, raise to 20, 4 callers. 98 to the flop after blinds and rake. Bet of 50 and one caller. Even without a raise, it is about 200. Do you play much live 1/3?

Yes. IÂ’ve seen $500+ pots preflop.

I guess I should’ve said “helpful to know what the previous action was”. Did V UTG raise to 41, H call on button, everybody else fold, check-check on flop? Did everybody limp preflop, check to H on flop who bets 30 and only V calls? Or something in between?


by chillrob P

Kind of funny how you need backers and hunt for promos then.

No, they're not exactly the same. Neither is applicable to full ring 1/3 NLH games.

If I were $250K ahead at SSNLHE I wouldn’t spend much time arguing online about a book I was never going to read.


by Mason Malmuth P

This is an example that starts on the bottom of page 184:

For more clarification, this is from page 35:

If somebody has already limped in front of you it’s still okay to sometimes limp with your monsters, especially if the players behind you raise a lot. But it may be better to just raise yourself (to about four big blinds) since you’ll have position on one player who you expect to call. And even if no one has limped-in before you act, you should sometimes raise with your best hands — AA, KK, QQ, AKs, AKo, and maybe AQs, just to mix up your play. (You should also sometimes just call a raise after you limped with one of these hands especially if you’re heads-up against an aggressive player who almost always makes a continuation bet.)


by David Sklansky P

The two things you brought up are common knowledge.

David, you once succinctly distilled your poker wisdom for me even further. After watching me play $1-3 NLHE for a while, you dryly remarked, "You know you don't have to play EVERY hand".


by Mason Malmuth P

For more clarification, this is from page 35:

Raising to 4xBB after a limper with QQ+/AK in a 1/3 game is awful.


by PointlessWords P

Still waiting for a response to this as promised by the authors.

Y’all said if I bought your book you’d go over it with me


Let’s go over it

RE: changing play after seeing an insignificant number of hands, of course we should?

E.g. suppose you raise UTG, BB calls, flop is AK3r, you cbet 1/3, they x/r, you call. Turn is 2, they bet pot, you call. River is a 8, they bet pot, you call. They show K4o.

Are you going to play GTO against this player? I know I'm adjusting after seeing this many blunders in 1 hand.

Especially at low stakes, we can adjust without seeing ANY hands. What's V look like (age/race/gender/attire/etc)? Sure, it's not 100% reliable, but poker is all about making decisions under uncertainty. If I can determine that V is 20% more likely to overbluff because of these types of variables then I'm adjusting before I even see a single hand, let alone a significant sample.


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